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Chicken or Checkin’?  
Rational Learning in Repeated Chess Games
* 
 
We examine rational learning among expert chess players and how they update their beliefs 
in repeated games with the same opponent. We present a model that explains how 
equilibrium play is affected when players change their choice of strategy when receiving 
additional information from each encounter. We employ a large international panel dataset 
with controls for risk preferences and playing skills whereby the latter accounts for ability. 
Although expert chess players are intelligent, productive and equipped with adequate data 
and specialized computer programs, we find large learning effects. Moreover, as predicted by 
the model, risk-averse players learn substantially faster. 
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1     Introduction 
Imagine two kings at the opposite sides of a battle field, each one in the lead of an army of 
knights and archers. Each king is considering his options: should he attack with the risk of 
losing or should he offer a truce? He knows that if he offers a truce, he signals potential 
weakness and that he would prefer not to engage in a battle, hence, offering a truce could 
encourage the opponent to attack. On the other hand, perhaps both kings prefer a truce but if 
none of  them  dares  to offer  it,  they  will  have  to  take  their  chances  on  the  battle  field. 
However, had the two kings agreed to a truce in the past, they would probably feel a lot less 
uneasy. They would attach a higher probability to the possibility of establishing a new truce, 
which in turn increases the probability that one of the kings will propose it. When such a 
peaceful outcome has occurred several times in the past, the kings will probably reduce the 
size of the army; why keep an expensive reserve when a war  is not very likely? In this 
example, the kings have learnt from past encounters, and this new information affects the 
future choice of strategy. Parallels can be drawn to the financial market: When there has been 
a certain amount of transactions between two traders, lenders and borrowers learn that the risk 
of default is not very high, so they are willing to reduce their risk premium. The problems for 
the kings, lenders and borrowers is that if there is some kind of (supply) shock, they will be 
more vulnerable, since they have lower reserves than before the learning process.
 1 
  Although these learning processes are important and common, little is known 
about how they work in practice. This is particularly true for rational learning. To address 
this issue, we turn to real chess games, performed by expert chess players. The purpose of the 
present paper is to examine strategic learning in repeated Bayesian games, using a large real 
world field data set. We test whether expert chess players, in repeated chess games with the 
same  opponent,  obtain  additional  information  which  leads  to  an  update  of  their  beliefs 
regarding  the  opponent‟s  degree  of  risk  aversion.    In  addition,  we  show  that  risk-averse 
players learn and update differently than risk-loving players. Specifically, we test whether 
risk-averse players, when they meet repeatedly, become increasingly likely to end the game in 
a so-called „arranged draw‟, which is an outcome the players can agree upon at any time 
during the early phases of the game while it is still undecided on the board, and where they 
                                                   
1 To give some further examples from economics, consider a union that must decide whether to accept the wage 
offer from the employer or to begin a strike with a risk of losing even more. Should a market-leading company 
let a newcomer enter the market and share the profit or should it start a price war with the risk of having to let 
the competitor in anyway? 
   3 
share the points. Thanks to the tremendous development in the accessibility of chess data over 
the last decade, we exploit the existence of a large panel data set, where the players have an 
almost perfect record of the game history of their opponents, including an evolving measure 
of playing skills of all players.  
It is known from experimental behavioral economics that strategic learning occurs, 
see Camerer (2003) and Young (2004). Recent theories model rational learning in repeated 
Bayesian games, but empirical testing of these models still lags behind, however, and existing 
studies are largely based on small-scale lab data. One reason for this is that it is difficult to 
construct beliefs that reflect genuine uncertainty about the opponent‟s strategies, yet at the 
same time, narrow enough to permit learning and to be able to observe the learning process in 
practice, i.e. it should not require too many repetitions for learning effects to emerge. To find 
field data that comply with these conditions has proven difficult.  
Most empirical research in behavioral game theory is based on lab experiments which 
have  been  criticized  for  being  too  unrealistic,  producing  results  that  are  valid  only  for 
particular subgroups in a sterilized setting. The number of observations is usually rather low. 
On the other hand, many lab experimentalists are not satisfied with findings resulting from 
field  or  observational  data  as  it  is  typically  not  possible  to  control  for  confounders 
satisfactorily.  Theorists  often  desire  a  continuous  line  of  vertical  logic  which  is  almost 
impossible to achieve in large-scale empirical studies. In short, there is a trade-off between 
having control over the experiment on the one hand and the number of observations and 
population representativity on the other.
 2 In this paper we bridge the gap between small-scale 
lab experiments and large-scale imperfect data by employing large-scale field data collected 
from real chess games but in a very controlled setting, where the rules of the game are the 
same  all  over  the  world,  and  where  it  is  possible  to  control  for  exact  playing  skill  by 
exploiting the Elo (1978) rating system (see section 2.2). The rules and homogeneity of the 
game of chess offer a setting that is a step towards a controlled lab experiment but at the same 
time supplies a data set reflecting real behavior with 1.5 million observations in a panel data 
structure.  
We contribute to the literature by bringing chess data into the analytical toolbox of 
empirically oriented economists and by showing that rational learning in games occurs in 
large-scale  field  data.  In  addition,  we  present  a  model  that  explains  how  players,  in  a 
                                                   
2 Levitt and List (2007) discuss the advantages and drawbacks of lab experiments. They argue that having one‟s 
actions scrutinized by others may have an unintended influence on the lab participants. For a discussion in favor 
of lab data, see Falk and Heckman (2009).    4 
Bayesian game, change their choice of strategy as they receive additional information about 
the opponent after each encounter. The model also predicts that risk-averse players  learn 
faster,  which  is  supported  by  our  empirical  findings.  Furthermore,  we  show  that  the 
likelihood of  a risk-averse outcome  increases continuously, when two risk-averse players 
meet repeatedly, although they knew the general risk type of the opponent in advance. Our 
findings suggest that equilibria may evolve over time as the learning process proceeds. The 
mere duration of stability may affect the level of risk taken by individuals in the sense that 
there is little need for a margin if the risk of default is very small.  
The  fact  that  elite  chess  players  are  considered  to  be  among  the most  intelligent 
subpopulations, with high levels of cognitive ability, has attracted several researchers within 
the field of economics. Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009) and Levitt et al. (2009) study chess 
grandmasters to analyze how they use backward induction to solve the centipede game. The 
former study finds that grandmasters do indeed use perfect backward induction, whereas the 
latter finds little support for that. Moul and Nye (2009) find that players from the former 
Soviet Union could improve their result by agreeing to early or pre-arranged draws. Simon 
(1955) contributed to economics with an influential paper, where he modeled the rational 
choice of chess players. These studies have in common that they take advantage of the fact 
that elite chess players constitute an upper boundary of the population, as far as rationality is 
concerned, and thereby serve researchers to establish a benchmark.
3 We have chosen to study 
the behavior of expert chess players for the same reason and due to the fact that the game 
setting is orderly and the information set, both for the players and the researchers, is very rich, 
which reduces the potential impact of confounders.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a chess background, and 
section 3 discusses risk-taking and the measurement of risk aversion in chess. Section 4 
discusses the conceptual framework of learning in repeated games and presents the theoretical 
model. In section 5 we discuss the data and the econometric strategy. Section 6 contains the 
results of the estimations, the sensitivity analyses and a placebo analysis. Section 7 concludes.  
 
                                                   
3 For other references to studies on chess players, see, for instance, Gobet (2005), Roring (2008) and Ross 
(2006).    5 
2     A Brief Introduction to Chess
 
This section contains a brief introduction to chess, a discussion of the opening strategies, an 
intuitive description of the Elo (1978) rating system (a formal description is given in the 
Appendix), and ends by discussing the information set of a chess player when preparing for a 
game.   
 
2.1 The Chess Game 
Chess is a sequential game where the players make moves in turn with white and black pieces 
on the chess board with the aim of capturing the opponent‟s king.  There are three possible 
outcomes of a chess game: you win, you draw (a tie), or you lose, which scores 1 point, ½ 
point, and 0 points, respectively.  
The fact that there is a third outcome, a draw, and the fact that it can be agreed upon 
by  the  players  at  any  time  during  the  game,  makes  chess  suitable  for  studying  risk 
preferences.
4 The offer is valid and binding until the opponent has made his next move. There 
are no rules regulating the minimum number of moves that have to be played before the 
players can agree upon a draw , except that the game must have started.  It is considered 
impolite to offer a draw more than once during a game.  
Most chess games recorded in Chessbase (which is described in sub -section 2.4) are 
played in chess tournaments or in team tournaments. In chess tournaments, it i s normal to 
play one game per day, and a tournament may consist of five to thirteen rounds, with ten 
being the norm. Since each player has an allotted time that is not to be exceeded, a game lasts 
at most six to seven hours.
5 If your time limit is exceeded, you lose the game (if the opponent 
still has material enough to capture your king, otherwise it is a draw). 
 
2.2 The Opening 
The description of the opening strategy is important for our definition of risk-taking in 
the next section, hence, we devote some time to explaining the opening strategy. 
There are different ways in which a player can affect the course of the game. The most 
obvious way is through the choice of opening. At the beginning of a chess game, both players 
choose an opening strategy (a strategic development scheme for their pieces) that will steer 
the game towards a style of play that best suits them and at the same time makes life less 
                                                   
4 Only the player, whose turn it is to move, may offer a draw. He has to make his move and then make the offer 
of a draw immediately after the move has been made. 
5 A chess clock has two clocks, one for each player.    6 
comfortable  for  the  opponent.  All  expert  chess  players  have  a  prepared  set  of  opening 
strategies  to  be  used  in  different  situations.  One‟s  chosen  set  of  openings  is  called  an 
“opening repertoire” (OR). To optimize performance, a considerable effort is dedicated to 
creating an opening repertoire that matches one‟s personality.  In the opening, the player must 
make a decision about the task of each piece, on which square to put it, whether its main 
purpose is to attack or defend, etc.   
When the game starts, it is in a balanced position, signifying that there is no advantage 
for either side. The opening moves are theoretical in the sense that they have been worked out 
beforehand as to maximize the expected score for each side. The theoretical moves are to a 
large extent memorized before the game, and, since no calculation is needed, these moves are 
often played quickly. While the game is still in the theoretical phase, the position remains 
balanced. If the theoretical extent of a certain opening variation lasts for twenty moves, then 
the “real” play and a potential deviation from the saddle point equilibrium does not start until 
the 21
st move. 
Chess opening strategies have been analyzed in extreme detail both by chess players 
and by computer programs. All expert chess players nowadays use computer programs and 
chess databases. The chess database reports the relevant statistics for each opening strategy, 
for instance, the mean score for each opening (based on the games stored in the database). 
This means that a player easily can observe how well an opening has scored in the past and 
the distribution of outcomes. Computers have the advantage that they can calculate much 
faster and more accurately than the human brain. For every calculated variation, the computer 
program evaluates the position and expresses it in units of pawns (e.g. +1 usually means that 
the position corresponds to white being one pawn up, materially). When both players play 
optimally, this value is (close to) zero in equilibrium. 
Since there are quite a large number of possible strategies by the opponent for each 
additional  move,  the  opening  theory  is  limited  (by  cognitive  constraints).  Most  opening 




2.3 The Elo Rating System 
A landmark for establishing chess as an analytical tool was the introduction of the Elo rating 
system (Elo, 1978), which made it possible to compare the strength of chess players on a 
                                                   
6 See de Firmian (2009).   7 
metric scale.
7 Named after its inventor, Arpad Elo, it has become the benchmark rating in 
chess. 
“[It] provides chess researchers with a valid measurement device unrivalled in other areas of 
expertise  research.  It  is  a  true  gold  standard  in  individual-difference  research.”  (Charness 
1992, p. 6).  
Thus, with reference to Elo (1978), it has become possible to measure skills on objective 
grounds, there are no “subjective assessments” (Chabris and Glickman 2006, p. 1040).  
The Elo rating scale is constructed in such a way that the Elo difference between two 
players corresponds to an exact expected score (performance). The Elo rating of a player 
increases, when the player scores above the expected score and vice versa. Figure 1 displays 
the scoring probabilities for different relative Elo ratings. In the Appendix we show how the 
Elo rating and scoring probabilities are computed.   
 
Figure 1 Expected scores for varying Elo differences.  
 
 
The expected score between two equally skilled players is .5, i.e. when the Elo difference is 
zero the expected score is 50 %. If a player has an Elo rating of 200 points more than the 
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2.4 The Information Set of a Chess Player 
A chess player in a tournament or team tournament typically knows in advance his next 
opponent, including the Elo rating, and will spend a considerable amount of time (from a few 
hours to half a day) preparing for that specific game, studying the opponent‟s style of play, 
opening strategies, etc. In doing so, the player uses books, computer programs, and a database 
of  chess  games.  Chessbase  is  arguably  the  most  comprehensive  and  most  used  of  such 
databases, and it contains a total of more than five million chess games. For each game, it 
contains all the moves by the players, the date of the game, the names of the players, their Elo 
rating at the time of the game (or at any point in the past), and the outcome. Hence, when 
confronting a new opponent, a chess player has the possibility to study the playing skill (the 
Elo  rating),  the  opening  strategies  and  playing  styles  of  the  opponent,  his  strengths  and 
weaknesses as reflected in his past games. In addition, the players have information about the 
age, nationality and gender of the opponent. The Chessbase database also calculates the score 
of  different  opening  strategies  based  on  real  games,  and  the  expected  score  based  on 
computer evaluations of the positions. 
In short, the chess player, when preparing for the next game, has – except for potential 
private information via e.g. friendship - access to exactly the same information set a priori as 
the econometrician who can access the same database.   
 
3     Risk-taking in Chess  
One standard way of defining risk aversion in economics is that a risk-averse agent prefers 
the utility of the expected value rather than the expected utility. Let  p, q and r denote the 
probability of a win, draw, and loss, respectively. Then, risk aversion in chess can be formally 
stated as  
        0 5 . 1 0 5 . 1 U r U q U p r q p U                (1) 
For a risk-loving agent the inequality is reversed.  
The  relation  between  p  and  r  depends  on  the  Elo  difference  between  two  given 
players. More precisely,  
          1 r p             (2) 
where    (0, 1) is the expected score of the player in focus, that is,  0 5 . 1       r q p  . If 
two players are equally skilled,  ½    and  r p  . However, this still leaves the player with a 
choice  of  risk  level,  since  she  can  choose  between  riskier  openings  that  provide  a  large   9 
winning probability (e.g. p=0.4, r=0.4, q=0.2) or a risk-averse opening leading to a smaller 
winning probability (p=0.2, r=0.2, q=0.6).
8 
If the Elo difference is positive (the player in focus is superior), then          1  is 
positive and, consequently, p>r, i.e. the probability of a win is greater than that of a loss, and 
vice  versa  if  negative,  but  the  choice  of  risk  strategy  remains.  Since  the  sum  of  the 
probabilities must equal one, we can substitute for r in (2) above and obtain  q p ½   . This 
is the player‟s constraint when choosing the opening strategy and the level of risk. Thus, a 
player‟s risk preferences affect the choice of p, and all parameters are pinned down when p is 
chosen. It follows that   p [0, ],   q [0,    p   2 ] and   r [  2 1  p ,    1 ]. To increase 
the winning probability, the player must accept an increased probability of a loss.  
To  see  that  a risk-averse  player  prefers  a  draw to  playing  the  game,  consider  two 
equally skilled players and then plug in the extreme values of p. Setting p=.5 and q=0 renders 
either the score 1 (a win) or 0 (a loss) with the expected score .5. Setting p=0 and q=1 renders 
the same expected score ½ with certainty. If both players are risk-loving, they will maximize 
p; if both are risk-averse, they will maximize q. If there is one risk-loving and one risk-averse 
player, then there will usually be an interior allocation of p and q since they are pulling the 
game in opposite directions in terms of riskiness.  
For each additional move that is played in a game, there is a risk of deviation from the 
theoretical opening balance,  with a reduced probability  of a draw. Hence,  if two equally 
skilled players have risk-averse preferences, they could reduce the risk by agreeing to a draw 
at an early stage. If one of two equally skilled players has made a mistake on the board, the 
probability of a draw is lower than when the position is still in the opening balance. Draws 
agreed to while still playing theoretical moves are usually referred to as arranged draws. 
Since the players have not really started to play, arranged draws depend on the players‟ 
preferences,  while  draws  agreed  to  at  a  later  stage,  when  the  theory  has  ended,  depend 
increasingly on the position on the chess board for each additional move.
9 Most opening 
                                                   
8 For a more detailed example, see Appendix.  
9 Regarding the difference between draws in general and arranged draws, Moul and Nye (2009) write: “Hard-
fought games that end in draws are more likely to last longer than collusive or pre-arranged draws. The latter are 
more likely to be agreed to at an earlier stage when the position on the board is still not fully resolved and it is 
not clear that one player should win. At a later stage the likelihood is much greater that the position will clearly 
favor one or the other player.”  (p.14). Risk preferences affect the preference for an arranged draw and may vary 
from game to game, depending on the opposition or other circumstances. Drawing preferences may also vary 
due to temporal variation in health condition, state of alertness/tiredness or if a draw would suffice to obtain a 
particular objective as for instance the win of a tournament. Naturally, a superior player would have lower 
drawing  preferences  against  an  inferior  opponent,  while  the  inferior  player  would  have  higher  drawing 
preferences compared to when the players are equal in playing strength.   10 
theory in chess lasts for about 15-20 moves and we have chosen to define an arranged draw as 
a draw in less than twenty moves.
10  
 
Definition 1. We define an arranged draw (AD) as a game that ended in a draw while the 
position was still in the theoretical phase. We assume that a game that has ended in a draw in 
1-19 moves is an AD. The utility of an arranged draw is denoted    ½ U .  
 
Definition  2.  Let     j U   be  player  j’s  utility  of  the  expected  score    1 , 0  j  ,  where 
0 5 . 1       r q p  , and let  j EU  be the expected utility        0 5 . 1 U r U q U p      , given 
We  define  a  risk-averse  player  as  having    j j EU U     a  risk-neutral  player 
  j j EU U    and a risk-loving player    j j EU U   . Furthermore, we say that a player is 
superior if  >½ and inferior if   <½. Finally, a player has a preference for an AD if 
  j j EU U  ½ , i.e., the utility of ½ points is greater than the expected utility, given , and we 
say that this player is of Type I. A player prefers to play the game through if the inequality is 
reversed, and we say that this player is of Type II.
11  
 
The intuition behind Definition 2 is that a type I player prefers a draw given the expected 
score whereas a type II player prefers to play for a win with the risk of losing given the 
expected score. Hence, the risk preferences are player-specific while the type I/II categories 
are game-specific, i.e., the risk preferences depend only on the individual whereas the type 
depends on the risk preferences and the relative playing skills of the players.   
 
Proposition 1. Assuming that  j  is distributed such that E[ j  ]=½, i.e. on average a player 
is as often superior as inferior, then a risk-averse player is more likely to prefer an AD (being 
of Type 1 than a risk-loving player, and vice versa.   
 
Proof. The definition of risk aversion is          0 5 . 1 U r U q U p U        . Substituting for 
p  and  q,  we  obtain          ) 0 ( (½) 1 2 1 1 2 U r U r U r U                Taking  the 
                                                   
10 Although this definition may seem somewhat arbitrary, it does not affect the results more than marginally. A 
sensitivity analysis is carried out with the definition 1-15 and 1-23 with similar results. 
11 For a player to prefer an AD, the following inequality most hold, 
          

  0
½ 1 2 2
½ U
U U
r r    11 
expected  value  of  both  sides,  we  have  that 
        ) 0 ( (½) 1 2 1 1 2 U Er U r E U r E EU              ,  which  is  the  same  as 
     E U       ) 0 ( (½) ) ( 1 2 1 1 ) ( 2 U r U E r U E r            . Since E[ ]=½, we know 
that        (½) 2 1 ) 0 ( 1 ½ U r U r U r U         which is equivalent to      ) 0 ( ½ 1 ½ ½ U U U   . 
The last expression is the very definition of risk aversion, whereas the left-hand side of the 
inequality is the definition of the utility of an AD.■ 
 
3.1 Measuring Risk-taking: The Openings Classification System  
As  we  have  already  argued,  risk  preferences  are  reflected  in  the  preferences  for  certain 
outcomes. The opening strategies are means to increase the probability of a certain outcome 
occurring.  
There exists a standardized classification of 500 chess opening strategies, which are 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive, called the ECO classification. To create a risk measure, 
we have categorized each of these 500 openings as either risk-loving, risk-neutral or risk-
averse.  To obtain such a categorization for each opening (and for each color, white and 
black), we consulted eight chess experts of different skills with Elo ratings ranging from 2000 
to 2600, five men and three women, and asked them to give their characterization of each of 
the 500 ECO codes.
12 They were instructed to define each opening as  risky, neutral or safe. 
We then compared the opinions of the experts and subsequently we define an opening to be 
risk-loving, risk-neutral or risk-averse if at least six out of eight experts agreed.
13 In cases 
when there  were five or fewer votes for either risk -loving or risk-averse, the opening  was 
considered to be risk-neutral. As a result of our experts‟ assessments, there are two labels for 
each game, one for each player. We will refer to this risk measure as the OR risk preference 
measure. We will also calculate the ratio of risk-averse (-loving) opening strategies divided 
by all games played by a player.  
In addition, we create a ratio of the number of arranged draws relative to the number 
of all games played by a player. We refer to this as the AD risk preference measure. The OR 
and AD risk measures are highly correlated as regards risk preferences.  
                                                   
12 According to the International Chess Federation (FIDE), a player is regarded as an expert if he/she has an Elo 
rating of 2000 or more. The lowest level required to obtain a Master title is a rating of 2300. A Grandmaster title 
usually implies an Elo rating of over 2500. In the year 1999 Garry Kasparov reached an Elo rating of 2851, the 
highest Elo rating ever obtained by a human player. 
13 The reason for using only 3 categorical values rather than, say, 10, is that the classification requires a very 
high level of expertise from th ose doing the categorization. Each of these players  needed several hours to 
complete the survey on the 500 opening codes.   12 
 
   
4     Conceptual Framework 
4.1 Theoretical Model 
There is a first-mover disadvantage in chess when proposing an arranged draw. This follows 
as offering a draw signals potential weakness. The opponent can then choose a strategy that is 
more  efficient.  There  is  also  an  increased  psychological  pressure  on  the  player  that  has 
revealed potential weakness. For these reasons, players do not want to offer a draw if it is 
likely that the opponent will reject the offer. Therefore, a player can benefit from learning 
about  the drawing  preferences  of  the opponent before  offering  an  arranged  draw.  In  the 
present  paper,  strategic  learning  is  measured  by  analysing  whether  the probability  of  an 
arranged draw between two players in earlier periods (lagged dependent variables) increases 
the probability of a future arranged draw. The hypothesis is that when players have agreed to 
earlier arranged draws, there is less uncertainty and thereby less risk that your opponent will 
take advantage of you signalling potential weakness. Hence, a risk-averse player has a larger 
preference for an arranged draw, but at the same time there is a risk involved in trying to 
avoid risk by offering an arranged draw.  
In this game, player 1‟s strategy set is offering a draw or passing (not offering a draw) 
whereas player 2‟s strategy set is accepting or rejecting given that an offer has been made. If 
player 1 passes, player 2 “becomes” player 1 and the game continues. Moreover, when a 
player has had a draw offer rejected, the game ends (though the chess game continues).  
Figure 2 displays the game which starts with nature selecting a type for each player, 
either type I where    1 1 ½ EU U  ,  or type II where    1 1 ½ EU U  . Since the players have 
perfect information about the game history of the opponents, they also know the general type 
of the opponent. If nature picks type II for player 1, then the game stops since a player that 
prefers to play for a win with the risk of losing rather than taking half a point with certainty 
will not consider offering a draw as a draw offer is binding. For simplicity, we leave this 
scenario (nature selecting type II for player 1) out of the game since the choices are then 
trivial. Note that the game is asymmetric in the sense that a type II player will never act as 
player 1. As we will see below, this asymmetry affects the optimal play differently for risk-
averse and risk-loving players.   
 When nature has selected type I for player 1, the game in Figure 2 starts. Nature also 
picks a type for player 2, but the type in this specific game is private information for player 2,   13 
that is, player 1 cannot observe the type of player 2 (symbolized by the dashed line at player 
1‟s information set). Nevertheless, player 1 has a belief about the opponent‟s utility of a draw. 
If player 1 chooses to offer a draw, then player 2 can choose either to accept or to reject the 
offer. If player 2 is of type 1, she will be better off by accepting the offer but should reject if 
she is of type II. If no offer is made, the payoff is simply the expected utility. If player 1 is of 
type I and chooses to offer a draw when player 2 is of type II and rejects the offer, a cost , 
where we assume that    i i   , 0  , falls upon player 1 for giving away private information 
(potential weakness) whereas player 2 receives the reward.  
 


















Since it is costly for player 1 to signal that she has preferences for a draw although she does 
not, player 2 knows with certainty the preferences of player 1 so player 2 simply accepts the 
offer if she is of type 1 and rejects if she is of type II. Player 1‟s choice, however, depends on 
her belief about player 2‟s type. She will be indifferent between the two strategies when they 
render the same payoff, that is, when     EU EU U
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draw , and not offer a draw if the inequality is 
reversed.  
The basic idea of the model is that  the more information a player receives about the 
opponent, the better the possibility to determine her utility of a draw. We assume that each 
player has a certain utility of a draw in a particular game and that a player tries to infer the 
opponent‟s utility by interpreting signals. With new information the player updates her beliefs 
before the next meeting. A player who receives no signals will infer the expected 
draw
j U  of the 
opponent  j  to  be  i  (i.e.,  the  stronger  is  player i,  the  higher  the drawing  preferences  of 
opponent j). Each time two players agree to an arranged draw, they receive the signal 
t
i   
about opponent i at time t, where      , ,II I
t
i   and I=accepted draw offer, II=rejected draw 
offer, and Θ=empty set of signals, i.e., no draw offer has been made. Since the game history 
of all players is common knowledge, the distribution by nature between the two types is also 
common knowledge. As the number of signals increases, it pulls the posterior beliefs away 
from the prior mean toward the true value. When the number of signals approaches infinity, 
the player can infer the 
draw U  of the opponent perfectly.  
        Let 
1
i  be player i:s initial belief that the opponent is of type I at time t=1. The prior 
1
i   
is a function of the opponent‟s game history, i.e.   
0 1
j i   , where    1 , 0 
t
i   is the game history 
until time t.  
The first time two players meet they use the game history of the opponent to infer the 
type. Thus, their initial belief is 
1
j   =   
1
i E   =   
0 1 | Pr i i I    . After each subsequent meeting 
the players update their beliefs so 
2
j   =   
2
i E   =   
1 0 2 , | Pr i i i I     . More generally, this can 
be expressed as;  
 
t
j   =   
t
i E   =        (3) 
 
where n is the number of previous meetings (in the empirical section we set n≤4 for practical 
reasons).  
 
Proposition 2. Given that not all signals are empty (all priors are too low), two risk-averse 
players receive more non-empty signals on average than one risk-averse and one risk-loving 
player. Moreover, one risk-averse and one risk-loving player receive more non-empty signals 









         ,..., , , | Pr
2 1 0  15 
on average than two risk-loving players. Hence, in general, risk-averse players update their 
beliefs more frequently than risk-loving players.   
 
Proof. For a signal to be non-empty, a draw offer has to be made which is only made by type 
I players, hence,   always equals zero. Since the initial belief of a 
player is a function of the game history of the opponent, i.e.  , a player sets a lower 
initial belief for a type II opponent than for a type I opponent. Given that not all priors are too 
low, it follows that   >   >  
 = 0.■ 
 
4.2 Hypotheses and Implications of the Model 
The way the game is constructed implies that the payoffs and equilibrium of the game are 
asymmetric for the two types. As has been discussed above, the best reply for a type II player 
is to avoid arranged draws. It follows that a type II player is never the first player to act and, 
consequently, this player is playing the best reply from the beginning. Hence, a type II player 
is not expected to update the beliefs and, therefore, there will be no learning for a type II 
player. Note that a risk-loving player will not always be a type II player so we still expect a 
risk-loving player to learn.    
Our hypotheses in this paper are that; i) Chess players learn about their opponent‟s 
utility  in  repeated  meetings  and  adapt  their  future  strategies  accordingly,  ii)  Risk-averse 
players learn faster than non-risk-averse players.  
Let   denote the learning effect (the updating of beliefs) for player  i at time t, 
where  . Given that at least some priors are sufficiently high, we have five 
cases;  
a)   > 0  [type I players learn and update their beliefs upwards] 
b)   = 0   [type II players do not update] 
c)   = 0     [no update without new information] 
d)   < 0   [type I players learn and update their beliefs downwards] 
e)    [not possible,  no signal without a type I player]  
 
  II II j i        , | Pr
 
0 1
j i  
  I I j i        , | Pr   II I j i        , | Pr
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j i       , |  16 
In this paper we cannot distinguish between rejected draw offers and no draw offer, so we 
compare accepted draw offers to rejected or no draw offers (lumped together). Hence, we 
investigate empirically whether   is greater than  .
14  
If the prior  , the  corresponding player will never offer a draw 
(under ceteris paribus conditions). This implies that if the prior is sufficiently high, there will 
be  a  change  of  equilibrium  and  a  divergence  between  the  risk -averse  and  risk -loving 
equilibrium. However, if th e prior is too low, there will be no change of equilibrium.
15 
Following from propositions 1 and 2, the model also predicts that more risk -averse players 
will learn more than risk-loving players as they update their beliefs more frequently.  
  Due to the simplicity and transparency of the game, the intelligence and cognitive 
ability of the players, together with the high level of information (game history and Elo 
rating), we find it reasonable to assume that the players, given their beliefs, are able to choose 
the optimal strategy. As the relative skill is known in every game, the players only have to 
know whether they prefer an arranged draw or not and evaluate whether they are willing to 
take the risk of offering a draw.
16  Even if they were to fail playing bes t reply at every 
moment, they will probably be very close to optimal behavior.
17  
 
5    Data and Econometric Model  
 
5.1 Data  
The data in this study were obtained from ChessBase 10, a database collection with more than 
1.5  million  chess  games  played  in  high-level  international  chess  events  by  expert  chess 
players  (Chessbase  10  has  more  than  5  million  games  in  total)  .  The  resulting  data  set 
contains about 30,000 players from 140 countries. Two levels of data are available, player-
specific information and game-specific information. The name, year of birth, nationality and 
gender of a player are available. For every game there are data on the names and Elo ratings 
                                                   
14 Here, players are supposed to take into account their chess-related payoff and their risk preferences but not, 
for instance, friendship or other kind of social preferences. If two friends, siblings or a couple play against each 
other,  they  may  receive  a  higher  utility  from  accepting  an  arranged  draw  although  they  are  far  superior. 
However, in this paper we want to exclude such effects and focus on genuine learning effects. Such potential 
confounders are discussed in section 6.2.   
 
15 Such implications are common, see for instance Young (2004) and Fudenberg et al. (2004). 
16 Recall that Moul and Nye (2009) found that the Soviet players were able to improve their tournament score by 
agreeing to arranged draws at the correct moment.     
17  We suggest that the players play in accor dance with the concept of  self-confirming  equilibrium.  This 
equilibrium concept was defined by Fudenberg et al. (2004). This equilibrium concept has similarities with the 















draw  17 
of the two players, year of the game, number of moves and score. The years included in this 
study range from 1997 to 2007 and the minimum Elo rating required is 2000, above which 
players are considered to be experts. As regards the information on a player‟s nationality, we 
have grouped the countries in regions based on geographic lines and chess popularity. The 
regions with the highest number of chess players are Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union. These three regions account for about 90 percent of the expert chess 
players in the world. Western Europe alone accounts for 53 percent, Eastern Europe for 24 
percent and the former Soviet Union for about 13 percent. Latin America, North America
18, 
Africa and Asia account for less than 10 percent.  
 
5.2 Econometric Model    
The unit of observation in the econometric model is the game. The dependent variable, Y, 
takes on the value 1 in the case of an arranged draw, and 0 otherwise.  
We condition on a set of information for each player. This set of information is the 
same  as  that  of  the  players,  available  from  the  database,  as  discussed  in  section  2.3. 
Information  about  the  two  individuals  participating  in  a  game  is  used  to  construct  our 
explanatory variables. For each game, we have two sets of characteristics, one for white, Xw, 
and one for black, Xb. Elo rating (playing skill), gender, nationality, age polynomials, number 
of games, OR risk preferences, regional and year dummies are included as control variables. 
Included in X are also player-specific history variables, such as the tendency for each player 
to play safe and risky openings with the relevant color (the fraction of games with a given 
color against players above 2000 where the player played safe, or risky), the tendency for 
each player to end a game in arranged draws, the total number of past games, etc. Thus, we 
control explicitly for the historical risk profile, the opening preferences, and the ability of 
each player. 
In addition, we include information on how often two players have met before with a 
set  of  indicators  for  the order  of  the  game.  Furthermore,  we  construct  a  set  of „lagged‟ 
dependent variables, taking the value 1 if there was an arranged draw in the previous game 
(and for 2, 3 and 4 time lags) between two players, 0 otherwise (i.e. including wins, losses 
and normal draws).  
Thus, regressing the dependent variable, an indicator for an arranged draw, on the 
lagged  dependent  variable,  a  positive  coefficient  implies  an  increasing  probability  of  the 
                                                   
18 As the U.S. Chess Federation applies a different rating of the playing strength many American players are 
missing in the data.     18 
occurrence of an arranged draw with repeated meetings in general. Conditioning as well on 
all the information in the database, we argue that the parameters on the lagged dependent 
variables can be given a causal – learning – interpretation. Interacting the lagged dependent 
variables with the risk profile of each player, as measured by the fraction of previous games 
ended in arranged draws will show whether risk-averse players learn faster or not.  
Each game is treated like an independent observation, except that we calculate robust 
standard errors that are cluster at the player level. As regards the lagged variables, the current 
encounter  is  the  dependent  variable,  whereas  the  first,  second,  third  and  fourth previous 
encounters correspond to the four lagged dependent variables. In cases where two players 
meet more than five times, the fourth lag is 1, lending it an interpretation of all learning 




6     Results 
6.1 Empirical Results 
The main results from the estimations are presented in Table 1. Due to the complexity to 
overview  the  results,  we  present  the  learning  effect  coefficients  in  Figure  3  which  also 
displays how the learning effects vary across risk level.  
From Table 1 we see that the „Opening Repertoire (OR) risk-averse‟ coefficients are 
as expected, i.e. they are positive and the probability of an arranged draw increases even more 
if both players are OR risk-averse. We also see that players of opposite sex have a smaller 
probability of an arranged draw. Being of the same gender has a positive  impact on the 
probability of an arranged draw. Moreover, the coefficient for having the same nationality is 
positive. It is possible that players of the same gender or nationality have a higher prior belief 
which would lead to faster learning. This may also capture part of a friendship effect, see 
section 6.2.  
Due to the complexity of the model, especially with respect to the marginal effect of 
past games on the likelihood of the present outcome, we present the marginal learning effect 
of past games in Figure 3 
   19 
Table 1. Estimation results for the main regression (LPM estimated with OLS).    
  Dep var: AD   
     
Opening Repertoire (OR) risk-averse, white  .0111   (.0009)***       
OR risk-averse, black  .0192   (.0011)***       
Both OR risk-averse  .0141   (.0014)***        
Female, white  -.0040    (.0018)**       
Female, black  -.0078    (.0015)***       
Both female  .0162   (.0026)***        
Same nationality  .0229   (.0008)***       
     
Learning effects     
Arranged draw (AD) 1 lag   .0582    (.0128)***        
AD 2 lags  .0510   (.0186)***        
AD 3 lags   -.0272   (.0228)       
AD 4 lags  .0970    (.0281)***        
AD 1 & 2 lags   .0363   (.0141)***        
AD 1, 2 & 3 lags  .06270   (.0273)**        
AD 1, 2, 3 & 4 lags   .0221   (.0345)        
AD 1 lag * AD risk (white)  .3184   (.0820)***        
AD 2 lag * AD risk (white)  .1760   (.1217)        
AD 3 lag * AD risk (white)  .8851   (.1572)        
AD 4 lag * AD risk (white)  -.2521   (.1719)       
AD 1 lag * AD risk (black)  .2313   (.0758)***        
AD 2 lag * AD risk (black)  .1764   (.1242)        
AD 3 lag * AD risk (black)  .4421   (.1582)***        
AD 4 lag * AD risk (black)  -.1499   (.1919)       
AD 1 lag * AD risk (white & black)  -.0345   (.4326)       
AD 2 lag * AD risk (white & black)  -.4551   (.6719)       
AD 3 lag * AD risk (white & black)  -3.8259   (.9164)***       
AD 4 lag * AD risk (white & black)  1.6205   (1.0094)        
     
Normal draw 1 lag (≥20 moves)  .0262   (.0020)***       
Normal draw 2 lags (≥20 moves)  .0178   (.0035)***        
Normal draw 1 & 2 lags  -.0075   (.0056)       
     
OR risk-averse share, white player   -.0068    (.0028)**       
OR risk-loving share, player   -.0077   (.0035)**       
AD risk, player  .4398   (.0078)***       
Number of historic games, player  -.00004   (.000004)***      
OR risk-averse share opponent   -.0200   (.0024)***       
OR risk-loving share opponent   -.0165   (.0030)***       
AD risk, opponent  .4089   (.0061)***       
Number of historic games, opponent  .000003   (.000004)        
     
2
nd encounter  .0052   (.0013)***        
3
rd encounter  .0014    (.0025)        
4
th encounter  -.0051   (.0035)       
5
th encounter  -.0216   (.0032)***       
     
Elo, (white & black)  Yes     
Age, Age-2 (white & black)   Yes    
Regional dum. (white & black)  Yes   
Year dummies (date of game)  Yes   
Constant   -.1821   (.0104)***      
Number of games/players  744,307 / 32.093   
Notes:  Western  Europe  is  used  as  a  reference  group  for  the  regional  dummies.  Robust  standard  errors  in 
parentheses, clustered at player level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. AD is 
short for Arranged Draw, and OR is short for Opening Repertoire. „White‟ refers to the player holding the white 
pieces, „black‟ refers to the player holding the black pieces.   20 
Figure 3 also displays how the learning effect varies across risk preferences, where the 10
th 
percentile is the 10
th percentile in the distribution of the variable measuring the faction of past 
games for a given player that ended in an arranged draw. The 10
th percentile thus represents 
the risk-loving chess players, while the 90
th percentile represents those that are most risk-
averse.  Figure  3  shows  that  in  general,  learning  about  each  other‟s  preferences  occurs, 
reflected in the positive marginal effect of past arranged draws on the probability of another 
arranged draw. Moreover, as predicted by the theoretical model, there is more (and faster) 
learning for more risk-averse players. For the 90
th percentile we find that the probability of an 
arranged draw is  55 percentage points greater when the four previous meetings ended in 
arranged draws than when no arranged draw has been agreed to in the past. For the 10
th 
percentile this effect is 30 percentage points.
19  
     
Figure 3. The learning effects for 1-4 earlier AD:s for different levels of risk preferences, 
where the 10
th percentile is the most risk-loving and the 90
th the most risk-averse group.    
     
 
Figure 4 displays the results for amateurs and professionals, and same-nationality, different-
nationality games, separately. The purpose is to see if the pattern remains for professional 
players,  especially  when of  different  nationalities.  It  is  less  likely  that  friendship  has  an 
                                                   
19 The effect on the probability of arranged draws from having played normal draws (twenty moves or more) in 
earlier encounters, see Table 1, is much smaller than the effect from having played earlier arranged draws. The 
effect is about 2 to 3 percentage points. Having played normal draws in earlier meetings might increase the 
probability of an arranged draw as it may suggest that a draw is the most probable outcome in any case. There is, 
however, limited evidence for this type of learning.   
   21 
important impact on the probability of arranged draws among professional players and should 
also be less common across nationalities.
20  
  
Figure  4  –  learning  effects  for  different  subgroups,  amateurs  with  same  and  different 
nationality, respectively, and professionals with same and different nationalities, respectively.  
 
Note: The marginal effects are evaluated at the median of the AD risk aversion distribution. 
 
The  fact  that  the  learning  effect  also  appears  for professional  players  and  for  players  of 
different nationalities reduces the probability of friendship driving the results. There is no 
significant difference between same and different nationality subgroups. There is, however, 
some difference in the size of the effect between amateurs and professionals. This may be due 
to  the  fact  that  professional  players  typically  have  more  a  priori  information  about  the 
opponents than the amateurs have.  
As a placebo analysis, Figure 5 shows the results from a regression, where arranged 
draws, defined as draws in fewer than twenty moves, are replaced as the outcome variable by 
draws in 30-49 moves. As is seen in Figure 5, the effect from the placebo „treatment‟ is close 
to zero (actually slightly negative). 
 
                                                   
20 Note that the findings by Moul and Nye (2009) that the Soviet players tended to collude, relate to the absolute 
world elite, and hold only in countries where there was a strong political pressure on the players to perform. 
Players at lower levels or in countries with greater political freedom are not very likely to „sacrifice‟ themselves 
for the nation in individual tournaments.     22 
Figure 5 - Placebo (draw in 30-49 moves) and real learning effects (draw in 1-19 moves).   
 
Note: The marginal effects are evaluated at the median of the AD risk aversion distribution. 
 
Figure 6 presents the results when the difference in playing skill, the Elo difference, is smaller 
than 50 Elo points and larger than 200 Elo points. If a player is substantially more skilled than 
the opponent, her belief about the opponent‟s drawing preferences will be close to one while 
the corresponding belief of the opponent will be close to  zero. For this reason, when the 
difference in playing skill is large between two players, the learning is expected to develop 
slower since the superior player‟s belief cannot increase (much) more and the inferior player 
will suspect that the opponent‟s preference for an arranged draw in the past was temporary.  
 
Figure 6 – learning effects when the Elo difference is < 50, and > 200 points, respectively.  
     23 
Note: The marginal effects are evaluated at the median of the AD risk aversion distribution. 




6.2 Potential Confounders 
One possible confounder in this context is the existence of friendship (friends, siblings or 
similar)  between  two  players,  which  could  increase  the  non-economic  payoff  from  an 
arranged draw. In general, it is extremely difficult to obtain information about such payoffs 
but we can control implicitly for several factors which makes it less likely that the results are 
driven by friendship.  
First, the effects found in this paper are large and monotonically increasing. If these 
effects are driven by friendship, there would have to be a substantial, monotonic increase in 
friendship from  one game to another. It seems more plausible that the effects are due to 
updating of the beliefs. Second, we find that risk-averse players learn about twice as fast 
which, if the results are driven by friendship rather than real learning effects, would indicate 
that risk-averse players have a more developed friendship. Although possible, there is no 
consensus pointing in this direction. Third, we find learning effects also for professional 
players.  It  seems  less  likely  that  people  playing  chess  for  a  living  should  let  friendship 
interfere with “business”. Fourth, we find no learning effects when replacing arranged draws 
with  the  “placebo” outcome,  i.e.,  draws  in  30-49  moves.  Since  draws,  regardless  of  the 
number of moves that have been played when agreed to, give half a point, friendship should 
affect the outcome also in the placebo regression.
22 Fifth, we also find that the learning effects 
are lower when the Elo difference is larger. This is in line with the learning effe cts predicted 
by the theoretical model but cannot be considered to be a typical pattern if driven by 
friendship. If anything, the pattern should be the reversed as rivalry usually increases when 
players are more equal in skills.  
Finally, we should point out that we find some support for players of similar gender or 
nationality showing faster learning effects, see Table 1. One can argue that friendship is likely 
to be stronger within the same gender or nationality than otherwise. This argument would 
give some support to friendship being the driving factor behind the results. However, we 
                                                   
21 When comparing male and female players, there is, although not significantly different from each other, a 
small tendency for female players to learn faster than male  players. This is in line with the consensus that 
women are more risk-averse than men.  
22 The effects from including normal draws (twenty moves or more) as explanatory variables are very small 
compared to arranged draws.    24 
propose an alternative interpretation. It is possible, and perhaps also likely, that the initial 
prior is higher when the players have the same nationality or gender, i.e., it may be easier to 
interpret pre-game signals when having a similar cultural background.
23  
 
7     Conclusions
 
We conclude that there is rational learning involved in repeated chess games between two 
chess players. Past outcomes between two players affect the beliefs about the opponent‟s 
preferences in future games, although the general type of the opponent is known in advance. 
The magnitude of the effects is large with roughly an additional 10 percentage points higher 
probability for each additional previous arranged draw. The theoretical model we develop for 
this setting, predicts that risk-averse players  learn faster than risk-loving players, as they 
receive more signals. We find strong support for this being the case. The learning effect is 
about twice as large for the most risk-averse players (at the 90
th risk percentile) compared to 
the learning effects for the most risk-loving players (at the 10
th risk percentile). The fact that 
risk-averse  players  learn  faster  depends on the  construction  of  this  particular  game.  The 
conclusion  from  this  is  rather  that  people,  although  they  have  the  same  intellectual  and 
cognitive  ability,  may  learn  differently  depending  on  their  preferences,  in  this  case  risk 
preferences.    
The  learning  effects  survive  several  sensitivity  tests.  We  carry  out  a  “placebo 
treatment” which, as predicted, shows no learning effects at all. Furthermore, large rational 
learning  is  found both for professionals and amateurs and we also find that the learning 
effects decrease when the difference in playing skill increases. The fact that the results are 
insensitive to such tests strengthens the liability of the findings, as it is less likely that they are 
driven by friendship or other “social” preferences.  
Studying intelligent and productive expert chess players with high cognitive capacity 
that are well equipped with adequate data and specialized computer programs is important 
when analyzing rational learning. By considering such an extreme group, we may obtain a 
boundary result as regards rational learning. Although not representative for the society as a 
whole the findings resulting from analyses on this subgroup may supply researchers with an 
upper bound which can be used as a benchmark in future research on these topics.    
                                                   
23 Such arguments have been suggested by, for instance, Cornell and Welch (1996) and Lang (1986).    25 
Ultimately, with this study we hope to demonstrate how useful large-scale chess data 
from  international  expert  chess  games  can  be  for  economic  research.  As  a  chess  game 
constitutes a highly controlled environment with homogenous rules across countries, it can be 
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The Elo Rating System
24 
The following description aims to show how winning probabilities are calculated and how 
Elo rates of chess players are subsequently updated. 
In the late 1950s, Arpad Elo, a physicist and a devoted chess player, introduced a new system 
of classifying the strength of chess players. By observing results from chess tournaments, he 
noted  that  the  distribution  of  individual  performances  in  chess  resembled  a  normal 
distribution.  On  the  basis  of  his  observations,  he  introduced  a  point  scale,  where  he 
determined the standard deviation to be 200.  The distribution relates to the difference in 
ability between two players. Defining μ as the difference in Elo strength between two players, 














 e x f             (1) 
As there are two participants, each of them with an assumed performance deviation of 200 
Elo points, the standard deviation used in (1) can be rewritten as follows: 
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      (3) 
For example, this is saying that the probability of winning is 76 [24] percent if one player has 
200 Elo points more [less] than his/her opponent. When two players are equally strong (i.e. an 
Elo difference equal to zero), the most likely outcome is a draw. 
Elo ratings: A sequential estimate of strength 
The probability of winning as shown in equation (3) is used to update a player‟s Elo rating. 
The algorithm for this reads as follows:    
Elo_new = Elo_old + (Score-Prob(winning))*k    (4) 
Here Elo_old is the Elo rating before the game starts, whereas Elo_new is the updated rating. 
The Score indicates the actual outcome of a game, where a win [loss] is valued as 1 [0], and a 
draw counts as .5 point. The coefficient k is a weighting factor that determines how much the 
outcome of a game counts for a player‟s Elo rating. It is determined by the number of games 
played, i.e. the less experienced a player is, the higher the k.  
 
 
Example: Let us hypothesize that there are two players with an Elo difference of 100 Elo 
points.  This  corresponds  to  an  expected  score  of  approximately  62.5%  (or  5/8)  for  the 
superior player and 37.5 (or 3/8) for the inferior player. The players will then choose the set 
of probability parameters (p and q) as to maximize their utility. For instance, the  inferior 
player could choose between two different parameter combinations, in the first p=2/8 and 
q=2/8  whereas  in  the  second  p=1/8  and  q=4/8.  Both  strategy  choices  render  the  same 
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3    , we have  25 .  r p , i.e. the probability of a win is lower than the probability of a 
loss due to the fact that the player is inferior by 100 Elo points. In this example,    8
3 , 0  p , 
  8
6 , 0  q  and    8
5
8
2 ,  r .  The second strategy is more risk-averse since it leads to a higher 
probability of a draw.  
 